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Abstract—By offering sophisticated services and centralizing a
huge volume of personal data, modern smartphones changed the
way we socialize, entertain and work. To this aim, they rely upon
complex hardware/software frameworks leading to a number
of vulnerabilities, attacks and hazards to profile individuals or
gather sensitive information. However, the majority of works
evaluating the security degree of smartphones neglects steganog-
raphy, which can be mainly used to: i) exfiltrate confidential data
via camouflage methods, and ii) conceal valuable or personal
information into innocent looking carriers.
Therefore, this paper surveys the state of the art of stegano-
graphic techniques for smartphones, with emphasis on methods
developed over the period 2005 to the second quarter of 2014.
The different approaches are grouped according to the portion
of the device used to hide information, leading to three different
covert channels, i.e., local, object and network. Also, it reviews the
relevant approaches used to detect and mitigate steganographic
attacks or threats. Lastly, it showcases the most popular software
applications to embed secret data into carriers, as well as possible
future directions.
Index Terms—steganography, smartphones, covert channels,
information hiding, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the rapid technological advances of software
and hardware led to mobile phones offering capabilities pre-
viously achievable only for desktop computers or laptops (see
reference [1] for a discussion of this evolution). The increasing
convergence of network services, computing/storage function-
alities, and sophisticated Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs)
culminated into new devices called smartphones, which are
quickly becoming the first choice to access the Internet [2], and
for entertainment. Nevertheless, the Bring Your Own Device
(BYOD) paradigm makes them core tools in the daily working
routine [3].
This popularity is mainly driven by a multi-functional flavor
combining many features, such as a high-resolution camera,
different air interfaces (e.g., Bluetooth, 3G and IEEE 802.11),
and Global Positioning System (GPS) into a unique tool. To
handle the hardware, the typical Operating System (OS) has an
architecture very close to the one used on desktops [4]. Then,
the resulting vast user base ignited the development of many
applications delivered from online stores, or through special-
ized sources on the Web. Even if similar hardware/software
platforms are at the basis of a more general class of smart
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devices (e.g., tablets), to avoid cannibalization of market
shares, many products do not implement the 3G/telephony sub-
system. Yet, for the sake of simplicity, we use smartphone as
an umbrella term, despite when doubts arise.
Alas, the unavoidable increasing complexity and the ex-
plosion of exchanged data volumes, dramatically multiply
vulnerabilities/attacks (see, e.g., references [5] and [6] for
two recent surveys on security issues of mobile devices), or
“social" threats [7]. For the same reasons, smartphones are
becoming an excellent target for profiling users, or to gain
sensitive information [8].
In this perspective, steganography1 should be explicitly con-
sidered to completely understand smartphone security, since
it encompasses various information hiding techniques for em-
bedding a secret message into a carefully chosen carrier, while
cloaking the very existence of the communication to any third-
party observers. Consequently, steganography is a double-
edged sword. On one hand, it can be used by individuals to
enforce security and privacy by embedding sensitive data into
“irrelevant" carriers, for instance, images/audio files. On the
other hand, it can be exploited by malware to hide the exfiltra-
tion of confidential/personal information, or communications
towards the Command & Control (C&C) in a botnet.
As today, there are few surveys on information hiding. But,
some target a general audience, for instance they describe
the history and the development trends of steganography [9],
[10]. On the contrary, other works only focus on specific
and narrow areas, e.g., IP telephony [11] or stream pro-
tocols [12]. To our best knowledge, there are no previous
comprehensive surveys on information hiding techniques for
smartphones, since reference [13] only focuses on colluding
applications, and reference [14] is limited to methods based
on the physical interaction with the devices, e.g., “smudge"
attacks exploiting oily residues left on the touch screen surface,
which are definitely outside the scope of this work. Despite
many steganographic techniques to create covert channels in
desktop-class environments (partially surveyed in [9], [11],
[15] and [16]) can be ported to smartphones, the rapid cre-
ation of new dedicated approaches imposes to update past
efforts. Having a unique and multi-functional tool combining
features previously covered by several separate devices needs
a broader investigation. In fact, past surveys could be too
“vertical" in their organization, since they aimed at covering
1The term derives from the merge of two Greek words, steganos
(στγαυóς) meaning “covered", and graphì (γραφη) meaning “writing".
The first evidence of this practice is rooted back to 440 BC by Herodotus,
while the first usage of the term is around 1499. Steganography is sometimes
defined as an art.
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2specific protocols or services. Instead, smartphones require a
wider perspective allowing to grasp all the areas in which
information hiding can take place, thus demanding for a more
“horizontal" scheme.
Therefore, this paper aims at filling this gap, and its main
contributions are: i) the development of an “horizontal" taxon-
omy to classify steganographic techniques for smartphones; ii)
the systematic review of the literature on information hiding in
the period 2005 to the second quarter of 2014, with emphasis
on methods used on mobile devices, or that can be successfully
borrowed from desktops; iii) the evaluation of known or
perspective detection approaches, and a quick review of the
most popular tools; iv) the discussion of the lessons learned,
the potential research opportunities, and directions to advance
the field of smartphone steganography.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II introduces motivations, Section III outlines the survey
architecture, and Section IV provides the proper background.
Then, Section V deals with steganographic methods based on
the alteration of digital objects, Section VI to establish a covert
channel between two processes sharing the same physical
device, and Section VII to build a flow of information be-
tween remote parties. Section VIII reviews the most effective
countermeasures, and lastly, Section IX concludes the paper
and envisages future research directions.
II. MOTIVATIONS
Globally, it is estimated that there are about 5 billions
of mobile phones worldwide, of which ∼1.08 billion are
smartphones [17]. Moreover, according to International Data
Corporation (IDC), the worldwide mobile phone market is
expected to grow 7.3% year over year in 2013 [18]. It must be
emphasized that a relevant pulse to this increase is caused by
worldwide smartphone shipments that are expected to surpass
1 billion units for the first time in a single year. For example,
in the US alone, in the second quarter of 2012, almost 55%
of mobile phone owners had a smartphone, as reported in a
survey by Nielsen [19]. A key reason of this huge success
is the advancement of cellular connectivity, allowing users
to interact with high-volume or delay-sensitive services while
moving, e.g., through the Universal Mobile Telecommunica-
tions System (UMTS), or the Long Term Evolution (LTE)
[20]. Proper support of fragmented traffic [21], jointly with
the availability of energy-efficient Graphics Processing Units
(GPUs), make them also an excellent platforms for online
gaming [22].
Thus, it is not surprising that smartphones are currently
a natural target for steganography, since information hiding
techniques were always influenced by how people communi-
cate, also causing steganographic carriers to evolve through
the ages [10], [23]. Accordingly, the research community is
even more interested in creating new data hiding paradigms
on smartphones, especially for the following reasons:
• popularity reduces suspicions: the more a certain carrier
is utilized, the better is its masking capacity, as hidden
communications can pass unnoticed amongst the bulk of
exchanged data;
• “opportunity makes the thief": the availability of several
applications, services and protocols (possibly combined
in a sophisticated manner) dramatically increases the
chances for hiding information within the TCP/IP stack,
or smartphone’s services, e.g. Multimedia Messaging
Service (MMS) or Short Message Service (SMS). Even-
tually, this makes the smartphone a multi-dimensional
carrier.
To demonstrate the importance and timeliness of the topic,
we report four recent stories on the exploitation of steganog-
raphy as the enabler to leak information, or to conduct large-
scale attacks:
• 2008 – steganographic methods have proven to be useful
for data exfiltration. It was reported that someone at the
U.S. Department of Justice smuggled sensitive financial
data out of the Agency by embedding information in
several image files [24];
• 2010 – steganography demonstrated that can pass unno-
ticed for long periods. It was discovered that the Russian
spy ring of the so-called “illegals" used digital image
steganography to leak classified information from USA
to Moscow [25];
• 2011 – steganography witnessed to scale. The Duqu
worm moved stolen data towards many botnet’s C&C
servers (i.e., nodes used for coordination and information
gathering purposes) via apparently innocent pictures, thus
traversing the Internet without raising any suspicion [26];
• 2014 – steganography showcased its effectiveness for
signaling purposes. When installed on user’s machine,
the Trojan.Zbot downloads a jpeg file into the infected
system. Within the image there is a list of banks and
financial institutions, which network traffic has to be
closely inspected [27].
With such premises, jointly with the rich set of features
concentrated within an unique device, smartphones enable to
use a wide variety of steganographic methods developed in
other environments, as well as novel and dedicated techniques.
Besides, boundaries among different services and applications
are progressively vanishing, thus increasing possibilities of
merging different mechanisms into more sophisticated ones.
For such reasons, grouping into a unique work the portion
of the literature dealing with data hiding in other contexts,
but of exceptional interest or straightforwardly applicable
to smartphones, along with relevant studies, allow to better
understand current scenarios and trends. At the same time,
this effort should avoid to underestimate some threats.
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE SURVEY
To structure the survey in an efficient way, we group
papers (i.e., techniques) according to what component of the
device is enabling the steganographic process. To this aim,
we developed the taxonomy depicted in Figure 1, which is
composed of three different classes. Each one results into
a method and a related hidden channel with a well-defined
scope. In more details:
• Smartphone Objects Methods (Section V). The key idea
is to use digital objects produced and handled by modern
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Fig. 1. Taxonomy used in this survey to organize the main information hiding
techniques targeting smartphone’s components and possible examples.
devices as carriers for the hidden data. Methods belonging
to this class take advantage of the “multimedia" vocation
of modern smartphones, and can be further partitioned
according to the type of objects used, i.e., images, audio,
video, and text. This section discusses how steganography
can be used to embed secrets in objects, which can be
remotely sent to create an object covert channel, or stored
within the device, to increase the safety level of secrets.
• Smartphone Platform Methods (Section VI). As said,
modern devices have hardware and software equipments
comparable to desktops. Hence, the access to and control
of resources and sensitive data require an adequate degree
of security, which is usually enforced by dedicated layers
within the OS. In this perspective, platform methods are
primarily used to bypass the security framework deployed
within the smartphone, essentially to enable colluding
applications to communicate. In a similar extent, also
hardware components can be used to leak information
to the surrounding environment: in this case, they will
be discussed separately, as to avoid doubts. The resulting
fine-grained partition is as follows:
– Targeting OS: the channel is created by using lower
layers of the smartphone’s OS, such as shared notifi-
cations, file-system locks, and manipulable interpro-
cess communication functionalities;
– Targeting Hardware: the channel lives within the
physical behavior of the smartphone, for instance
by altering the idle state of the Central Processing
Unit (CPU), or its working frequency. Besides, in
this class we also present methods using specific
peripherals of the smartphone, e.g., the Near Field
Communication (NFC) module, the built-in camera
or the microphone.
To recap, this section principally reviews methods used to
covertly exchange data across different processes within
the same device, thus resulting into a local covert chan-
nel.
• Smartphone Communication Methods (Section VII).
Other than the legacy telephonic communication, smart-
phones supports a multitude of packet-switched trans-
mission services over the air. Therefore, the resulting
channels can be subdivided into two main categories:
– Targeting Legacy Services: the exchange is made by
solely using “telephonic paths", i.e., the data belong-
ing to voice conversations, the SMS or MMS. Many
of the techniques studied in the related literature
are adaptations of some objects method to mitigate
the minimal amount of data embeddable within such
vectors. Though, the availability of several works of-
fering novel contributions for the case of SMS/MMS
make worth mentioning this approach standalone;
– Targeting Smart Services: the channel is created by
virtue of “Internet-grade" functionalities offered by
the device, such as a complete TCP/IP protocol stack,
as well as the support to full-fledged networked
applications (also considering the mobile counterpart
of the desktop-class version). Since investigating
steganography for desktop applications is outside the
scope of this work, we will only consider here those
exploitable in smartphones.
Then, in this section we will primarily concentrate on
how to take advantage of the communication features of
a smartphone to create network covert channels, which
are of paramount importance to exfiltrate data outside the
device.
Nevertheless, the taxonomy will be also used to present
techniques to detect, eliminate or limit the aforementioned
steganographic channels (Section VIII). Similarly, papers and
methods will be grouped according to which kind of covert
channel they mitigate or prevent (i.e., object, local, and net-
work).
Despite the proposed organization has been developed to
be simple but efficient, some papers mix different techniques
simultaneously, thus belonging to multiple classes at the
same time. When possible, different ideas will be discussed
independently in the proper section. Otherwise, the paper will
be addressed where it contributes more.
To avoid overlaps, we will always classify works according
to the carrier embedding the secret, rather than how the
steganogram is delivered (e.g., a method to hide data into
a picture sent via MMS will be discussed into Section V
– Smartphone Object Methods). Conversely, if the approach
deeply exploits features of MMS, it will be discussed into
communication methods.
Although desktop steganography is outside the scope of
this survey, to have the proper foresight, papers discussing
techniques, which should/could appear on smartphones in the
near future will be concisely addressed. In this case, to avoid
confusion, techniques are reviewed separately.
To increase the accessibility to the surveyed papers, and to
have a quick reference, we provide four overview tables:
• Table I portraits an overall snapshot of the steganographic
mechanisms targeting smartphones discussed in this sur-
vey, as well as a short description of the idea at their
basis. Roughly, the number of methods are uniformly
distributed among the different covert channels, empha-
sizing the equal importance of the different carriers.
Yet, solutions using SMS/MMS exploit many trivial and
limited approaches, thus they should progressively vanish
4in the near future (at least in this incarnation);
• Table II groups methods that could/should be ported over
smartphones, but as today have been only investigated in
desktops. As shown, methods relying upon IEEE 802.11
are the most promising one, especially by considering
the ubiquitous availability of wireless connectivity also
in cost-effective devices. Also, the pervasive diffusion of
Voice over IP (VoIP)-based services could play a role in
the future. For both classes, the major issue preventing
their effective utilization relies in software constraints;
• Table III offers a rendition of methods according to their
capacity (as defined in Section IV-A). This table only
contains works where authors provided a performance
evaluation (regardless real or simulated). As it can be
noticed, only a small fraction of papers reports quantita-
tive results, or theoretical estimations. Nevertheless, the
achieved bandwidth is usually modest, with the exception
of techniques using voice codecs;
• Table IV is similar to Table III but focusing on techniques
not yet tested in smartphones. Despite the efforts needed
to be ported, their adoption over mobile appliances must
be further evaluated, since it could reflect in reduced
performances imposed by hardware/software limitations,
or excessive battery drains.
Lastly, to complete the overview of the major findings of
this work:
• Table V (Section IV) summarizes all the definitions and
properties concerning steganography used through the
rest of this survey;
• Table VI (Section V-G) presents a snapshot (updated at
February 2014) of the steganography tools available for
Android and iOS implementing a modest portion of the
surveyed mechanisms.
IV. STEGANOGRAPHY FUNDAMENTALS AND ITS
EVOLUTION
In this section we provide a compact tutorial on steganog-
raphy and its recent evolution. We recall, that major defini-
tions/properties used throughout the rest of the survey are
summarized in Table V.
A. Definitions and Goals
Steganography is the process of embedding secret messages
into an innocent looking carrier, defined as steganographic
or hidden data carrier. Its importance increases with the
ubiquitous availability of digital information, since the pro-
cedure to inject data is influenced by how communication
methods evolve, e.g., from letters written with sympathetic ink,
to computer networks. When used to conceal information in
digital environments, the scientific community has been using
many denominations, mainly steganography [9], [28], covert
channel [29], [30], or information hiding [9]. This stems from
the introduction of terms in different époques, and reflects the
vitality of this research field. We point out that, this work
adheres on the belief that “steganographic methods are used
to create covert (steganographic) channels" [31].
Communication channel  
(with covert channel) 
MHID 
Bob 
F-1STEG 
Alice 
FSTEG 
KSTEG 
MCAR MSTEG M’STEG 
MHID 
MCAR 
Warden 
Fig. 2. Model for hidden communication based on the Simmons’ prisoners
problem [34].
Typically, steganography is used to achieve one of the
following goals:
• to conceal a valuable information in a carefully chosen
carrier to keep a secret safe;
• to hide the very existence of the communication if the
carrier is transmitted between the parties involved in
steganographic data exchange. Eventually, this further
permits to keep any third-party observers unaware of its
presence.
In both cases, choosing the most suitable data carrier is
crucial to guarantee an adequate degree of secrecy. The two
most important properties for a carrier are:
• popularity: the used vector should be not considered as
an anomaly itself, potentially unmasking the existence of
the hidden communication;
• unawareness: modifications needed to embed a secret
data should be not “visible" to a third party unaware of
the steganographic procedure.
Example: consider a steganographic method hiding data
through the manipulation of a digital image. Its alteration
would lead to artificial noise, potentially revealing the
steganographic communication. Therefore, distortions (noise)
introduced by the steganographic procedure must be not
perceptible by human senses, i.e., the visual system.
The inverse of steganography is defined as steganalysis, and
it concentrates on the detection of a covert communication.
Such a discipline has started to surface fairly recently, mainly
ignited by developments in the performance of hardware and
availability of ad-hoc software tools. Its modern nature reflects
in applications for the embedding of data considerably out-
numbering those dedicated to the detection and extraction of
secrets. For instance, as February 2014, the largest commercial
database of steganographic tools (not limited to smartphones)
contains more than 1, 200 applications [32], while Hayati et
al. [33] only mention 111 tools dedicated to steganalysis (alas,
the last update is dated back to 2007).
B. Model and Scenarios
The hidden communication model underlying steganogra-
phy is based on the famous “prisoners’ problem” [34], firstly
formulated by Simmons in 1983, and graphically represented
in Figure 2.
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STEGANOGRAPHY METHODS INVESTIGATED IN THE SURVEY CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE TAXONOMY OF SECTION III.
Target CC Type Key idea for embedding data References(s)
Image Object Data hiding within the LSB of images [53], [54], [55]
Image Object Matrix encoding to reduce modifications [56], [57], [58]
Image Object Hidden data within Exif metadata [59]
QR Code Object DCT/3DES data embedded into a QR Code [60], [61]
QR Code Object LSB/VQ images embedded into a QR Code [62], [63]
Audio Object Phase coding and echo hiding within audio files [16]
Audio Object Spread Spectrum coding within audio files [64]
Audio Object Alteration of bits produced by the Huffman encoder in mp3 [66]
Video Object LSB alteration applied to video frames [54]
Video Object Embedding/Manipulation of tags in FLV files [68]
Text Object Semantic alterations of texts sent via mails or chats [70], [71]
Text Object Exploitation of metadata within content rich formats, e.g., PDF or Word Documents [72], [73]
SMS Network/Legacy Ad-hoc permutations of 3× 3 blocks of pixels in 140-byte long b/w pictures [93], [94]
SMS Network/Legacy Text manipulation, e.g., abbreviations, spaces patterns, or word displacing [95], [96]
SMS Network/Legacy Data posing textual games (i.e., Sudoku) [97]
SMS Network/Legacy Patterns based on system/proportional font selection [98]
MMS Network/Legacy Spacing in markup languages [99]
MMS Network/Legacy Data hiding within the LSB of an image (optimized for MMS) [100]
MMS Network/Legacy Alter the quantization step of the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) [101]
MMS Network/Legacy Apply Pseudo-Random Noise (PRN) on a image (a là spread spectrum) [102]
MMS Network/Legacy Embedding of data encrypted with an elliptic curve [103]
Voice Network/Legacy Manipulation of the Adaptive Multi-Rate Wideband (AMR-WB) codebook bits used in 3G [104]
Voice Network/Legacy Manipulation of the Adaptive Multi-Rate (AMR) codebook bits used in 3GPP standards [105]
Voice Network/Legacy Alteration of the last 5 bits of frames used in the G.723.1 low-rate codec [106]
Voice Network/Legacy Low power tones artificially added within the GSM-encoded voice [107]
Web/HTTP Network/Smart Usage of intentionally crafted URLs [80]
Multimedia Stream Network/Smart Alteration of the delays between sent video streaming frames [108]
Web/HTTP/TCP Network/Smart Selection of certain content of the banner sent from the remote server [108]
OSN Network/Smart Filename alterations and tagging of photos to be posted online [110]
OSN/IM Network/Smart Attribute manipulation within the XMPP message services [111]
OS Local/OS Differencing vibration settings [80]
OS Local/OS Differencing volume settings [80]
OS Local/OS Acquiring and releasing wake-lock permissions [80]
OS Local/OS Competition for a file lock [80]
OS Local/OS Modification of single or multiple general settings [81]
OS Local/OS Automatic broadcasts sent to the interested applications [81]
when modification of particular setting occurs
OS Local/OS Exploitation of type of intents (e.g. flags, action, etc.) in the broadcast messages [81]
OS Local/OS Manipulation of the number of active threads in /proc directory [81]
OS Local/OS Using State (open/closed) of a socket [81]
OS Local/OS Data coded into number of free blocks on the disk [81]
OS Local/OS Exploiting the processor usage statistics available in /proc/stat [81]
OS Local/OS Utilization of the time elapsed between the sender process changes its priority [83]
after the screen switches off
OS Local/OS Usage of time elapsed between the sender process changes its priority [83]
Hardware Local/HW Hijack of the time elapsed after a screen switch off [83]
Hardware Local/HW Use of the time elapsed between two consecutive screen activations [83]
Hardware Local/HW Manipulation of the load on the system and infer bits [81]
by experiencing high or no load in the predetermined time frame
Hardware Local/HW Variation of the load on the system and infer bits [81]
by monitoring the trend of the processor frequency
The model considers two prisoners, Alice and Bob, jailed
in separate cells, and trying to communicate to prepare an
escape plan. Their messages are always passed through – and
inspected by the Warden: if any conspiracy is identified, he
will put them into solitary confinement. To succeed in the
escape, Alice and Bob must find a way to exchange hidden
messages.
To be more formal, denote as MHID the hidden message,
and as MCAR the innocent looking carrier. To bypass the
Warden, both Alice and Bob must agree on a steganographic
method: this is the pre-shared knowledge denoted as KSTEG.
Then, to hide and unhide the secret, they use FSTEG(·) and
F−1STEG(·), respectively. To create a covert communication
channel, the sender alters MCAR by applying FSTEG(·) to
have a MSTEG:
MSTEG = FSTEG
(
MCAR,MHID
)
Similarly, the receiver will use F−1STEG(·) with MSTEG to
have MHID, as well as the original MCAR:(
MHID,MCAR
)
= F−1STEG
(
MSTEG
)
However, the channel (the Warden in the scenario of Sim-
mons) may alter the hidden message MSTEG, for instance
due to noise, resulting into M
′
STEG. This can be also the
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STEGANOGRAPHY METHODS POTENTIALLY PORTABLE OVER SMARTPHONES AND MAJOR CHALLENGES TO BE ADDRESSED.
Target CC Type Key idea for embedding data Major Challenges Ref.(s)
Video Obj. Alteration of color space of an MPEG stream Not known if the hardware is able to extract the hidden [40]
data without impairments or excessive battery drains
Video Obj. Alteration of motion vectors of an MPEG stream Not known if the hardware is able to extract the hidden [41]
data without impairments or excessive battery drains
Text Obj. Alteration of metadata within .doc or .pdf documents Compatibility tests to reveal possible limitations [72]
in the implementation on smartphones [73]
NIC Net./HW Alteration of the Cyclic Prefix of IEEE 802.11n frames Hard to deploy for desktops and smartphones [87]
since the access to hardware/NIC driver is required
NIC Net./HW Manipulation of fields of the FCF of IEEE 802.11a Hard to deploy for desktops and smartphones [88]
since the access to hardware/NIC driver is required
NIC Net./HW Exploitation of bits used in padding of IEEE 802.11g Hard to deploy for desktops and smartphones [89]
since the access to hardware/NIC driver is required
NIC Net./HW Hiding data in well-suited corrupted frames Hard to deploy for desktops and smartphones [90]
since the access to hardware/NIC driver is required
Skype Net./SS Utilizing PDUs with silence to carry secret data bits Some difficulties may arise due to [50]
limited capabilities/functionality of mobile OSs
VoIP Net./SS Voice transcoding to free space for secrets Some difficulties may arise due to limited [49]
capabilities/functionality of actual mobile OSs
VoIP Net./SS Exploitation of intentionally highly delayed voice PDUs Issues may arise due to limited [113]
capabilities/functionality of actual mobile OSs [114]
BitTorrent Net./SS Manipulates the order of PDUs in the BitTorrent protocol Some difficulties may arise due to [51]
limited capabilities/functionality of mobile OSs
Quake III Net./SS Manipulates some bits of the angles used to Tests are needed to quantify if the overhead can be [115]
locate the player on the game world faced by the HW already running the 3D engine
outcome of an intentional data morphing/alteration to impede
steganography (see, e.g., [35] for a detailed discussion on
preventing network traffic camouflage). As a consequence,
the steganographic communication could be voided due to
difficulties in computing the F−1STEG(·).
The development of digital communications enabled
steganography to be used in more general forms than the
one originally envisaged by Simmons. As shown in Figure
3, a secret exchange can be implemented in four different
scenarios, labeled as (1) – (4). By denoting with SS the
sender of secret data, and with SR the receiver, two core usage
patterns are possible:
(1): SS and SR perform some overt data exchange,
while simultaneously exchanging secret data. As a con-
sequence, the overt and the hidden paths are the same;
(2) – (4): only a part of the overt end-to-end path is used
for the hidden communication by SS and SR, which are
located within intermediate nodes. Thus, the sender and
receiver are, in principle, unaware of the steganographic
data exchange.
C. Fundamental Properties
All steganographic methods exchanging data between two
endpoints can be characterized by the following properties
(also defined as performance indexes):
• steganographic bandwidth (or capacity): it is the volume
of secret data sent per time unit by using a given method;
• undetectability (or security [28]): it is the inability to
detect a steganogram within a certain carrier (e.g., by
comparing the statistical properties of the captured data
with the typical known values for the carrier);
Intermediate  
Network Node 
Intermediate 
Network Node 
Overt 
Sender  
Overt 
Receiver 
Overt communication 
SS SR 
SS SR 
SS SR 
SS SR 
Hidden communication extent (steganogram exchange) 
(1) 
SS – Secret Data Sender   SR – Secret Data Receiver 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Fig. 3. Hidden communication scenarios for steganography generalizing
covert/overt channels.
• robustness: it is the amount of alterations a steganogram
can withstand without destroying the embedded secret
data.
Unfortunately, steganographic properties heavily depend on
the specific methods, and their computation via formal frame-
works is still an open research problem [36]. Therefore, they
are often evaluated via empirical analyses or simulation tools.
Ideally, the perfect steganographic method should be both
robust and hard to detect, while offering the highest possible
bandwidth. But, a trade-off among the performance indexes is
always necessary, as thoroughly discussed in the seminal work
of Fridrich [37]. The relation ruling the interdependence of the
7TABLE III
STEGANOGRAPHY BANDWIDTH OF SURVEYED METHODS (AS/IF PROVIDED IN THE REFERENCE PAPER).
CC Type Manipulated Carrier Bandwidth [bps] Ref.
Local/OS Vibration Settings 87 [80]
Local/OS Volume Settings 150 [80]
Local/OS Screen State 5.29 [80]
Local/OS File Locks 685 [80]
Local/OS General Settings 56 (single), 260 (multiple) [81]
Local/OS Automatic Intents 71 [81]
Local/OS Automatic Intents 3, 837 [81]
Local/OS Threads Enumeration 148 [81]
Local/OS UNIX Socket Discovery 2, 129 [81]
Local/OS Free Space on Disk 11 [81]
Local/OS Reading /proc/stat 5 [81]
Local/OS Task List/Screen State 0.3 [83]
Local/OS Process Priority 0.3 [83]
Local/OS Process Priority 17.6 [83]
Local/HW CPU 3.7 [81]
Local/HW CPU 4.9 [81]
Local/HW Screen State/Elapsed Time 0.22 [83]
Network/SS Live streaming/Altering delays 8 [109]
Legacy/Voice AMR-WB codec 1, 400 [104]
Legacy/Voice AMR codec 2, 000 [105]
Legacy/Voice G.723.1 codec 133.3 [106]
TABLE IV
STEGANOGRAPHY BANDWIDTH OF METHODS POTENTIALLY PORTABLE OVER SMARTPHONES (AS PROVIDED IN THE REFERENCE PAPER).
CC Type Manipulated Carrier Bandwidth [bps] Ref.
WLAN/HW IEEE 802.11 (cyclic prefix) 3.25 M (BSPK), 6.5 M (QPSK), [87]
13.0 M (16-QAM), and 19.5 M (64-QAM)
WLAN/HW IEEE 802.11 (FCF) 16.8 [88]
WLAN/HW IEEE 802.11 (padding) 1.1 M for data frames, 0.44 M for ACKs [89]
WLAN/HW IEEE 802.11 216 k [90]
Network/SS Skype packets with silence 2, 000 [50]
Network/SS VoIP stream payload 32 k [49]
Network/SS Chosen voice packets’ payload 600 [113], [114]
Network/SS BitTorrent peer-peer data exchange protocol 270 [51]
Network/SS Quake III Protocol 8− 18 (more will cause lags in the game) [115]
Steganographic bandwidth 
Robustness Undetectability 
Fig. 4. The trade-off relation between the three performance indexes charac-
terizing a covert channel [37].
metrics is often called magic triangle, and depicted in Figure
4. Put briefly, its rationale is that is not possible to increase
a performance index without lowering the other two. For the
sake of completeness, we just mention the magic hexagon,
which describes a more enhanced space [38], but it is seldom
adopted.
Example - Applying the magic triangle to image steganog-
raphy: consider using some bits of an image as a method to
embed secrets. Alterations result into noise, which must be
kept under a given threshold in order to be undetected. Yet,
the more bits are used for the secret (the bandwidth increases),
the more would be the noise, thus making the method more
fragile (detectable) [39].
D. Evolution of Digital Steganography
We briefly review the most relevant techniques for the
evolution of steganography, spawned by the advent of digital
information and networking. In this perspective, the cutting-
edge research on data hiding for smartphones focuses on:
• digital media;
• linguistic (or text);
• device resources;
• network.
We point out that linguistic techniques are not dynamically
evolving as others, but the complete support by modern smart-
phones of textual communication and software for editing
documents make them relevant.
1) Digital media steganography: it is the most established
part of the information hiding discipline, as it dates back to
the 1970’s, when researchers developed algorithms to secretly
embed a signature in digital pictures (called a watermark).
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DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF STEGANOGRAPHY USED IN THE SURVEY.
Term Definition
Steganography The set of information hiding techniques for
embedding a secret message into a well-suited carrier
Steganographic (or Hidden Data) Carrier The innocent looking carrier (e.g., a picture) embedding the secret message
Secret Message, Hidden Message The message to be sent covertly also maintaing third-party observers unaware
Steganogram The result of secret data embedded within the carrier
Covert Channel The resulting secret channel (also called the steganographic channel)
Overt Channel A channel that is not hidden and publicly observable
Steganalysis The pool of techniques for the detection of a covert communication
Property Definition
Steganographic Bandwidth (or Capacity) The volume of secret data that can be sent per time unit
for a given steganographic method
Undetectability (or Security) The inability to detect a steganogram within a carrier
Robustness The amount of alterations a steganogram can withstand without
destroying the embedded secret data
Type of Steganographic Channel Definition
Object Covert Channel The channel is created by exchanging secrets embedded in a digital object
Local Covert Channel The channel has a scope limited within the physical boundaries of the device
Network Covert Channel The channel exists to exfiltrate data from/to the device
During the years, different methods have been proposed, rang-
ing from Least Significant Bit (LSB) modifications, to texture
block coding [16]. Modern smartphones can also manipulate
video, thus starting the creation of many techniques to embed
data within an Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) video
carrier [40], e.g., secrets can be stored within video artifacts,
or in the metadata describing the compressed media [41]. A
similar approach is used for audio, since the human auditory
system can be eluded through its “masking property", i.e.,
noise or stronger tones make weaker ones inaudible [42].
Besides, smartphones are also digital jukebox, thus many
works consider audio-specific compressed formats, like MPEG
- Layer III (mp3) in a way similar to the video counterpart
(see, e.g., reference [43] for a survey on the topic).
2) Linguistic (or text) steganography: it exploits various
aspects of the written word, hence the carrier is the syntactic
and/or the semantic structure of the text. The most popular
techniques are: word-spacing alteration, displacement of punc-
tuation marks, word order manipulation or patterns built on the
choice of synonyms [44]. Currently, owing to the large volume
of daily spam messages, an emerging field investigates their
adoption for steganographic purposes [45].
Object Covert Channel: techniques that belong to 1) and
2) allow to create an object covert channel that can be further
utilized to i) conceal the users’ secrets with the intent of storing
them locally on the device, or ii) if a modified file is sent to
a party aware of the applied steganographic scheme, to hide
the very existence of the communication.
3) Device Resources Steganography: it embraces tech-
niques to form a covert channel within the same physical
entity. Device resources steganography includes methods that
typically allow inter-processes data exchanges within the sin-
gle host. The quintessential carrier is a system-wide resource,
e.g., the CPU load [46], the level of a buffer, memory zones,
or storage resources. Such techniques have been recently
becoming en vogue, since they are increasingly applied to
achieve steganography in cloud computing environment [47].
Local Covert Channel: methods using this kind of steganog-
raphy enables to create a local hidden path among entities
within the same device.
4) Network Steganography: it is the youngest branch of
information hiding, but it is the most fast developing. Network
steganography may utilize one or more protocols simultane-
ously, for instance by exploiting relationships between differ-
ent layers of the ISO/OSI stack. One of the earliest mechanism,
considered as the very ancestor, is the utilization of different
fields (mainly unused or reserved bits) within the header of
protocols belonging to the TCP/IP suite as a hidden data carrier
[48]. More advanced methodologies include steganography in
real-time services like IP telephony [49], or in peer-to-peer
(p2p) services such as, Skype [50] or BitTorrent [51]. Recently,
Online Social Networks (OSNs) like Facebook [52] have been
targeted as a possible carriers of hidden data. Nevertheless,
specific techniques exploiting emerging network protocols,
like the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [12]
are part of the ongoing research.
Network Covert Channel: network steganography tech-
niques allow to create a channel for communicating in a hidden
manner from/to a device, and typically this is done through a
communication network.
Remark: in digital media steganography the aim was to
fool the human senses as to make the distortions introduced
by applying information hiding technique not perceptible by
a person. On the contrary, in local resources and network
steganography the key goal is to fool other processes or
machines. As a consequence, steganographers must properly
consider the totally different characteristics of the adversary.
V. SMARTPHONE OBJECTS METHODS
As discussed, modern devices can capture and manipulate
audio and video, take high-resolution pictures and create text
via full-featured word processors. Additionally, the Software
as a Service (SaaS) paradigm allows to edit contents even in
presence of resource limited devices. As briefly introduced in
9Section IV-D, smartphones offer a variety of carriers to embed
secret data, being a relevant platform for exploiting the so
called digital media steganography.
Potentially, all the methods developed for desktops could be
applied to mobile platforms, and many techniques have been
also offered to consumers via online stores (a list dedicated to
smartphone is compiled in Section V-G). However, many of
the available solutions are plain ports, and the related literature
introduces little novelty, with the only notable exception of
steganographic approaches based on Quick Response (QR)
codes.
Therefore, the papers presented in this section are limited
to objects/techniques that has been successfully tested within
a mobile device.
A. Images
The most popular technique used for embed secrets in
digital images is still the well-known LSB algorithm [16]. As
the name suggests, it relies on modification of least significant
bits of pixels, and it has been proposed in many variations [53],
[54] and [55], and tools (e.g., MobiStego, Stego Message,
Incognito, and Steganographia, to mention some). Yet, LSB
steganography is widely considered as a poor choice, since it
can be easily nullified by introducing random substitutions in
the least significant bits of pixels values.
One exception is given by the more sophisticated F5 al-
gorithm [56] (for instance, implemented by the Pixelknot
software). F5 has a high steganographic capacity and it is quite
hard to detect, since it utilizes matrix encoding to improve
the efficiency of the embedding procedure, and to reduce
the number of required image modifications. Also, it applies
permutative straddling to uniformly scatter the secret data
across the carrier image, thus increasing its robustness. Even if
many improvements to F5 have been proposed recently, e.g.,
nsF5 [57] or HUGO [58], they are still not publicly available
to users or other researchers.
Lastly, the increasing diffusion of the Exchangeable image
file format (Exif), containing metadata and information such
as tags, and GPS positions, makes also possible to use it as a
carrier to store hidden information (see, e.g., [59]).
B. QR codes
QR codes are barcodes with black and white square dots
resembling random noise (an example of QR code is presented
in Figure 5). Despite other contactless technologies like the
Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID), a QR code does not
require dedicated readers, or the need of deploying physical
tags. QR codes can be created in a very simple way, for
instance by using free software tools. Therefore, they appear
in many places, such as posters or flyers, and they can store
simple text, contact information, or URLs. To access the
information, it is sufficient to capture the code with a camera,
which is decoded via a proper application.
From a steganographic viewpoint, QR codes can be also
adopted as hidden data carriers. In this vein, they are used as a
“first step" before applying some digital image steganographic
technique. Specifically, Chung et al. [60] propose to transform
Fig. 5. Example of QR code.
secret data into a QR code, and then embed it in a digital image
by performing the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) which is
a commonly used technique to decorrelate the image data.
Similar approaches are discussed in [61] and [62]: the former
utilized QR code encryption using 3 DES (Data Encryption
Standard) for higher security and then the LSB to embed
resulting data into a covert image. The latter combines the
Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) and the Singular Value
Decomposition (SVD) into a DWT-SVD method to produce a
stealth QR code within a picture.
Another application is proposed by Wu et al. [63], where
authors rely on steganography to hide the presence of the
QR code for aesthetic purposes. Specifically, they use edge
detection and Vector Quantization (VQ) to make a QR code
invisible by humans, as to hide its presence in images or
commodities.
C. Audio
As hinted, one of the most relevant portion of research to
embed secretes into audio contents is based on the elusion of
the human auditory system. Besides classical LSB methods
(working with the same principle of those used for image
steganography, where instead of pixels, audio samples are
manipulated), the most popular algorithms use phase coding,
echo hiding [16] and Spread Spectrum (SS) [64]. Specifically:
• phase coding: the phase of an initial audio segment is sub-
stituted with a reference phase that represents the secret
data. To protect the relative phase between subsequent
segments the phase of the segments is adjusted;
• echo hiding: to hide data, synthetic resonances, crafted
in the form of closely-spaced echoes are introduced.
The latter, being very close in the frequency domain,
are inaudible by the human ears (this technique is also
exploited by the StegDroid tool);
• SS: originally proposed as a steganographic tool in [65],
it scatters the secret data across the entire spectrum of the
audio carrier. Typically, it offers a lower steganographic
capacity compared to LSB, but it is significantly harder
to detect.
While the previous techniques exploit the audio in a non-
compressed form, the ubiquitous diffusion of the .mp3 format
spawned several dedicated approaches, where secret data is
embedded by using the random alterations of the parity bits
produced by the Huffman encoder [66].
Yet, compression could be also an unwanted effect. For in-
stance the original audio embedding data could be compressed
by a third part, thus destroying the created steganogram. In
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this perspective, Bao and Xiaohu [67] discuss an mp3-resistant
method to protect the secret data by means of a well-suited a-
priori manipulation of the dynamic range of the uncompressed
audio object (similar to the pre-emphasis process used to
compensate attenuation in analog telephony).
Also, by virtue of the wide literature on digital processing to
face noise, today is now well understood that error correction
coding is a good supplemental carrier for audio steganography,
since any redundant information can be adopted to convey
secret information, even at the cost of losing some robustness
to random errors [16].
D. Video
The exploitation of video content as a hidden data carrier
is a rather new approach if compared with image or audio
steganography. Yet, the underlying techniques mostly overlap,
since a video can be demuxed into an audio stream and a
sequence of images. Besides, smartphones surely enable to
capture videos, but processing and post-production phases are
operations best accomplished on desktops. Therefore, by sur-
veying the literature on video steganography for smartphones,
we found that: i) there are not many papers nor tools dealing
with data hiding within videos produced by smartphones; ii) a
number of works tend to focus on techniques that previously
have been exploited for other digital media. Relevant examples
are tools like CryptApp or Steganography Application. Both
use the LSB algorithm to hide secret on a per-frame basis. A
similar approach is showcased in the work by Stanescu et al.
[54].
An important idea is to exploit the structure of specific
file formats for video contents. In this vein, Mozo et al.
[68] investigate the alteration of Flash Videos (.flv), which
are becoming widespread owing to the popularity among
users of sites like YouTube. In details, authors propose to
embed secrets by modifying video tags or by intentionally
deleting tags/fields used to populate the metadata structure for
describing/organizing the contents.
To summarize, the engineering of novel approaches target-
ing video steganography for smartphones is quite an unex-
plored field, hence reflecting in a lot of room for new research.
E. Text
Since smartphones can be used for creating text, we mention
here text steganography, which can be classified into three
main branches [69]:
• format-based: it modifies a text to hide data. Typical
techniques are: well-defined misspellings, fonts resizes,
and spaces/line skipping patterns. Even if such methods
can be hardly detected by a human, they produce severe
statistical alterations easily recognized by machines. For
such reasons, they are anachronistic and seldom used,
mainly by unskilled users in emails and SMS (see,
Section VII-A);
• random and statistical: the secret is encoded within the
statistical properties of a text, e.g., the distribution of
word lengths, or the frequencies of vowels and consonant
phonemes. Such techniques could be of limited impact
in smartphones, since they work efficiently when in
presence of very large texts;
• linguistic: the secret message is hidden within the struc-
tural flavor of the message, and could be used for instance
in e-mails [70] or in chats [71].
F. Methods Potentially Targeting Smartphones
A notable group of techniques to be mentioned are those
explicitly considering the features of MPEG data, which is the
preferred format to deliver and store videos over smartphones.
The two most important aspects of MPEG exploitable as
steganographic carriers are the video’s I-frames’ color space
[40] or P-frames’ and B-frames’ motion vectors [41]. However
they were never tested in such devices. While also cost-
effective phones are able to handle MPEG (also in a streaming
manner), proper experiments would be needed to quantify
if the hardware is able to extract the hidden data without
impairing the playback, or leading to excessive battery drains.
For what concerns text, smartphones also support desktop-
grade content-rich document formats, such as Microsoft Word
[72] and PDF files [73], which can be used to hide information
within their sophisticated data structures and metadata. In this
case, tests to understand wether the mobile counterpart uses
the very same formats and not limited capabilities implemen-
tations are needed. We underline that we put such methods
here for prudence, since the everyday routine of cross-editing
among phones and desktops do not hint at any differences in
their formats.
G. Tools Implementing Object Methods
Here we present a concise analysis of smartphone applica-
tions enabling the use of information hiding techniques. We
focus on tools available on official stores, therefore retrievable
in an easy manner for the most popular devices. Besides, we
solely investigate Android and iOS applications, since more
than 90% of current smartphones run such OSs [18].
On the average, applications offer basic functionalities, thus
mainly resulting helpful if the user wants to conceal the secret
information into a locally-stored carrier (usually, within a
digital image). Such a carrier can be shared by means of
communication services offered by the device (e.g., MMS,
emails, or posted on a shared album over the Web). Obviously,
the target must be aware of the steganographic procedure used,
hence enabling the creation of an object covert channel.
As today, there are a number of steganographic tools that
are available via Google Play (∼20) or Apple AppStore
(∼10). Table VI provides an overview of the most popular
steganographic tools. We underline that the majority shares
some common features, such as:
• many tools only rely on image steganography also using
basic techniques, resulting into easily discoverable chan-
nels. On the contrary, the most sophisticated and modern
smartphone steganography methods are still not publicly
available;
• about the totality of tools combines information hiding
technique with some cryptographic algorithm to cipher
the data before embedding the secret;
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TABLE VI
STEGANOGRAPHY TOOLS AVAILABLE FOR ANDROID AND IOS FROM APPLICATION STORES
Type of Steganography OS Tools
CryptApp, PixelKnot, Secret Letter, Shadow, Da Vinci Secret,
Camopic Lite, Steganography Application, Crypsis,
Image Android MobiStego, Stegais, Stego Message, Limage, StegoLite,
Secret Tidings, PtBox, Steganografia, Incognito,
Secure Message, VipSecret, Data Guardian
Audio CryptApp, StegDroid Alpha
Video CryptApp, Steganography Application
iSteg, PicSecret, StegoSec, SpyPix, Hide It In,
Image iOS Steganographia, Pixogram, Steganomatic,
Stega, Concealment, Invisiletter, iClic Reader
• a good amount of applications uses the multimedia
features offered by modern smartphones. In this vein,
it is possible to hide secrets in digital objects (e.g.,
images) already stored in the device, as well as to use
the camera/microphone to produce carriers on-the-fly.
Also, it is important to note that having such applications
installed on the smartphone would be an effective indicator
of steganographic attempts, eventually rising suspicious of an
attacker (in the sense of a warden). Thus inspecting the activity
of an user over a store (for instance, by analyzing whether
he/she rated the application), or by scanning the device for
local applications, could be used to void the steganographic
conversation. Thus, all suspected carriers can be subjected to
a detailed analysis making hidden data vulnerable.
Similarly, if the steganographic tool has been removed
(uninstalled in the jargon) it is also possible to scan the
device for related artifacts left out in the host OS, or to
find signatures within files handled by known steganography
methods. We point out that, this is how some commercially
available steganalysis tools operate [32].
To summarize, applications presented in Table VI are just
simple proof of concepts to better understand internals of
information hiding, rather than effective tools for production-
quality environments. In other words, they cannot be consid-
ered as definitive or effective for the clandestine exchange of
confidential data.
VI. SMARTPHONE PLATFORM METHODS
As hinted, modern smartphones have an architectural
blueprint very similar to the one of a standard desktop.
Accordingly, their reference platform is composed of three
major components enabling steganography: i) the hardware, ii)
the OS, and iii) a collection of device drivers. In this section we
concentrate on how they can be exploited to implement covert
channels. As depicted in Figure 6, a smartphone platform can
be targeted for two different purposes:
• to enable two (or more) applications running over the
same device to communicate. In this case, a local covert
channel is established, and to this aim, the main used
components are i) and ii);
• to exfiltrate data outside the device, resulting into a
network covert channel. For such a task, the main entities
exploited are ii) and iii).
OS#
Hardware#
Drivers#
Applica2on# Applica2on# Applica2on#
Fig. 6. Different portions of a generic smartphone platform used to implement
hidden channels (in dashed lines in the figure). A local covert channel is
created when the communication happens through two applications running
on the same device. If the target is located outside the device, a network
covert channel is needed.
Platform methods are primarily adopted to create a local
covert channel and seldom employed to leak data to a remote
party. This is mainly due to the rich set of options available
through the communication services offered by the device
(discussed in Section VII). A notable exception is the case of
malware, which use the OS as the preferred target to perform
the majority of covert communications [74].
Platform methods implementing a local covert channels are
of paramount importance to bypass the framework enforcing
security within a smartphone. Therefore, their evolution highly
depends on how modern mobile OSs enforce applications, or
third party libraries, to behave securely. Despite differences
due to vendor-specific solutions, the standard mechanism is
to use a sandbox with well-defined privileges. Within such
a perimeter, the application can only access to some kind
of resources (e.g., the address book), or functionalities (e.g.,
network services). The creation of this protected environment
varies according to architectural choices. For instance, Android
devices use techniques built on top of ad-hoc instances of
the Dalvik Virtual Machine [75], while iOS relies upon a
more layered approach [76] (see reference [77] for a vis-
à-vis comparison of the different implementations). For the
sake of completeness, other possible mechanisms are based on
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Process'A' Process'B'
Sandbox'A' Sandbox'B'
Network' Network'
Local'Covert'Channel'
Fig. 7. Reference usage of a local covert channel in a smartphone. Process
A wants to access the network, but Sandbox A prevents all the communica-
tions. Therefore, it creates a local covert channel with the colluding Process
B, which has the proper privileges.
hypervisors [78], or early detection of hazards by checking the
application through the publishing pipeline from the developer
to the “marketplace" [79].
Figure 7 depicts the quintessential usage of a local covert
channel to bypass a sandbox. Let us consider two processes,
Process A and Process B, running within Sandbox
A and Sandbox B, respectively. Also, let us assume that
Process A wants to use the network, e.g., to implement
a C&C channel to contact remote machines, but it has not
the proper privileges. Then, steganography is typical used as
follows:
1) Process A is the actual malware, while Process
B is a companion application (in some papers they
are defined as colluding applications). The latter is
engineered to appear innocuous, and recipient of proper
privileges. For instance, it could be an organizer tool
needing the access to the Internet for remote syncing,
which is a “reasonable" requirement;
2) Process A communicates to Process B through a
local covert channel;
3) upon receiving data, Process B uses its privileges
within Sandbox B to leak information.
Obviously, communications of Process B leaving the
device could be detected, for instance by inspecting the traffic.
Therefore, it is not uncommon to use another steganographic
method to build a network covert channel (described in Section
VII).
Figure 8 generalizes in more details the two main paradigms
used to encode information to perform a data percolation
among two processes, named sender and receiver. In the
following, the general term event is used to define a shared
entity that can be manipulated by the sender and observed by
the receiver, e.g., the state of the display, or the CPU load. In
order to properly work, this mechanism requires that the sender
and the receiver are both in a running state (labeled as ON
in Figure 8). However, the underlying birth/death evolutions
ruling the processes can be partially decoupled (as depicted in
the two examples of Figure 8).
According to the literature, the current state of the art is to
exploit two main data hiding techniques:
• temporal: in this case the shared event is repeated in time.
t 
Event 
Sender ON Sender ON 
Event 
x×ΔT x×ΔT 
Receiver ON 
t 
Event 
Sender ON Sender ON 
Event 
x×ΔV 
x×ΔV 
Receiver ON Receiver ON 
Fig. 8. Reference models for establishing a local covert channel within
modern smartphones. Upper: temporal. Lower: value.
Therefore, the secret information is encoded within an
integer value x representing the time gap between two
adjacent occurrences, i.e., x · ∆T . The main drawback
of the approach is due to the lack of precision within
the scheduler of the OS, thus limiting the achievable
bandwidth of the resulting steganographic channel;
• value: the secret data x is embedded within an alterable
value, e.g the CPU load, hence leading to a x ·∆V . This
method is less prone to glitches due to the lack of real-
time support of mobile OSs, yet it is fragile to noise
altering the manipulated value.
We point out that the previous approaches can be mixed
as to enhance the bandwidth of the covert channels, but by
paying a cost in term of complexity, fragility, and reduced
stealthiness.
Example - Colluding applications via vibration settings:
consider two applications enforced in their sandboxes wanting
to exchange data. Each attempt will be blocked, but they can
be programmed in advance to create a hidden channel (Figure
7). For the sake of the example, let us suppose they can control
the vibration setting of the device by using a specific system
call. Therefore, they can use a portion of the OS to actually
implement the channel (Figure 6). For instance, a secret bit
can be encoded by the sender application by setting/unsetting
the vibration mode according to a specific pattern of temporal
intervals (Figure 8). The target, by observing the status of the
ringtone (i.e., enabled or disabled), can then reconstruct the
secret, therefore resulting in a data movement between the
two processes, even if isolated.
A. OS-based Methods
All of the existing OS-based covert channels have been
proposed for Android operating system, probably mainly by
virtue of its opensource nature. In fact, we did not found
any paper dealing with other mobile OSs (also going back
to discontinued platforms like the Symbian).
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The first paper that introduced local covert channels has
been proposed by Schlegel et al. [80], and it uses information
hiding techniques to implement a malware called Sound-
comber. The latter is able to capture personal user data, e.g, the
digits entered on the keypad of the device during a phone call
to a customer care/bank call center. Soundcomber introduces
four different local covert channels, each one exploiting a well-
defined functionality of the smartphone.
In more details:
• vibration settings: the secret data is exchanged between
two colluding applications by differencing the status
of the vibration, i.e., the silent mode is toggled. One
application modifies the settings and the other interprets
this switch as binary data. The achieved steganographic
bandwidth is 87 bps, and it has been evaluated through
experiments on a real prototype;
• volume settings: the secret data is exchanged between two
colluding applications by selecting different values for the
volume of the ringtone. In principle, the covert channel is
similar to the previous one, but the availability of more
values (different sound intensities versus vibration has
only on/off states) enables to experimentally achieve a
steganographic bandwidth of 150 bps;
• screen state: the secret data is exchanged between two
colluding applications by acquiring and releasing the
wake-lock permission that controls the screen state. If
such lock is held for a sufficient time, then the screen
is prevented from turning on. Otherwise, the OS sends
a notification. This process can be properly modulated
by the sender, and trials demonstrate that the resulting
capacity is ∼5.3 bps;
• file locks: the secret data is exchanged between two
colluding applications by competing for a file lock. If one
application wants to send the bit 1, then it requests a file
lock on a commonly shared file. If also the receiver tries
to lock the same file, two outcomes would be possible:
the bit 1, if this attempt fails, or the bit 0 otherwise.
Manipulating such behavior leads to a steganographic
bandwidth of 685 bps, according to experiments done
by the authors.
The work by Marforio et al. [81] extends such ideas,
by exhaustively investigating the usage of different locks
simultaneously, mainly with aim of improving the stegano-
graphic capacity of the covert channel. They propose seven
different variations, and also provide a performance evaluation
of prototype implementations by using Android smartphones.
Specifically:
• single and multiple settings: similarly to Soundcomber,
the covert channel is created by concomitant alterations
of the vibration/volume settings. In this manner, the
steganographic bandwidth can be expanded up to ∼260
bps, which is an increase compared to the 87 bps and
150 bps achieved in [80] via the disjoint manipulation of
vibration and volume settings, respectively;
• automatic intents: in the Android OS, an intent is an
asynchronous object message allowing an application
to request functionality from other components (e.g.,
launch the address book) [82]. In this case, the secret
data is exchanged between two colluding applications
by using OS-wide notifications as the carrier (e.g., the
address book has been opened, or the address book has
been locked). Specifically, the method exploits broadcast
messages automatically sent to interested processes when
the modification of a commonly subscribed setting occurs
(e.g., all the applications are notified that the address book
has been changed). The resulting experimentally achieved
steganographic bandwidth is ∼71 bps;
• type of intents: the secret information is exchanged be-
tween two colluding applications by encoding data into
a type of intents, which is the kind of the event of
interest, rather than its value. Possible examples are,
subscribing for changes into a set of flags. Then, the
percolation is done in a similar way of automatic intents.
Since an intent is a form interprocess communication,
its utilization should be carefully evaluated, as to avoid
additional security risks besides steganography [82]. This
approach yields a quite high steganographic bandwidth of
3, 837 bps;
• threads enumeration: the covert channel is created be-
tween the two colluding applications by encoding data
into the number of currently active threads reported
into the /proc directory. The achieved experimentally
steganographic bandwidth is 148 bps, on the average;
• Unix socket discovery: similar to the threads enumeration,
but the secret is encoded into the state of a socket. The
resulting steganographic bandwidth is 2, 129 bps;
• free space on filesystem: the hidden transmission happens
by encoding data into the amount of free space in the
storage unit of the device. The number of free blocks
is controlled by the transmitting side by performing ad-
hoc crafted write/delete operations. The resulting
steganographic bandwidth is 11 bps;
• reading the /proc/stat: the secret data is exchanged
by encoding the information into the processor usage
statistics available in /proc/stat. For instance, the
transmitting side intentionally performs some compu-
tations to artificially alter the system load, while the
receiving side is monitoring the CPU usage, as a a way
to infer the transmitted secret data bits. Trials support a
covert channel capacity of 5 bps.
In the recent work by Lalande and Wendzel [83] additional
four ways to enable local covert channels are discussed.
However, according to the used taxonomy, only three are OS-
based, thus one will be presented in Section VI-B. While
designing the channels, authors primarily focused on how
to reduce their “attention raising" characteristics. But, as a
consequence of the magic triangle rule, this will lead to scarce
steganographic bandwidths. In details, the proposed methods
rely upon:
• task list and screen state: the hidden exchange between
two colluding applications is realized by encoding secret
data bits into the time that the sender application stays
active after the screen is switched off. Based on this
measurement, and under assumption that an user will
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not interrupt the receiving application, the latter can
infer secret data bits value. The achieved steganographic
bandwidth, which was only evaluated experimentally, is
very limited: ∼0.3 bps;
• process priority and screen state: this method utilizes a
synchronization scheme based on screen off states in a
way similar to the previous one. But, in this case, the
receiving side measures the time during which a given
process priority remains set to a reference value. The
sameness also reflects in the attained bandwidth of ∼0.3
bps;
• process priority: this is a simplified version of the former
technique, since the synchronization part is omitted. The
receiver scans the priorities of all possible processes until
it detects the predetermined value. Then, the secret data is
sent in a similar manner. Such approach greatly improves
the steganographic bandwidth up to 17.6 bps.
Notably, the work by Lalande and Wendzel [83] also
estimates how their methods would impact on the energy
consumption of the smartphone. This paper is an exception,
since the literature dealing with smartphones and steganogra-
phy almost neglect this topic. Although, battery drains due to
hidden communication should be always explicitly addressed,
since they can be exploited for detection purposes.
Their experimental results [83] demonstrate that the process
priority and screen state method is approximatively two times
more efficient in terms of energy consumption compared to
the task list and screen state and the process priority. Besides,
the energetic footprints for all the methods are almost masked
by the consumption of the kernel used by Android, which is
80 mJ/minute. However, the local covert channel exploiting
process priority is very energy consuming on the long run,
since the receiver needs to scan each time a large number of
Processes IDentifiers (PIDs) in order to discover the process
that will change its priority. This can lead to a quick depletion
of the battery of the hosting smartphone, potentially revealing
the steganographic attempt. Notice how this conforms again
with the magic triangle rule.
B. Hardware-based Methods
Compared to previous methods, hardware-based ones act on
the very low levels of the device, and primarily concentrate to
create an OS-independent local covert channel. As today, this
technique is still not very popular in the smartphone panorama.
Marforio et al. [81] engineered two local covert channels for
Android-based smartphones relying on processor statistics:
• system load: to encode secret bits, two patterns are
used (i.e, the x · ∆V depicted in Figure 8). The bit
1 is represented by the sender performing a variety of
computationally intensive operations, while the bot 0
is coded by switching the process to the idle state (in
other words, the sender relinquishes the CPU). During
experiments, the reached steganographic bandwidth peak
is 3.7 bps;
• usage trend: as a variation of the previous mechanism,
here the receiving side infers data by monitoring the
trend of the processor frequency by repeatedly querying
a proper system-wide interface. This method is more
efficient, and accomplished a steganographic capacity of
∼4.9 bps.
Also, the work of reference [83] contains a variation of
the screen state, but relying on the behavior of the hardware.
In this case, the sender switches the screen on and off to
send secrets. To decode the hidden information, the receiver
measures the time elapsed between two consecutive screen
active states (i.e., the x · ∆T depicted in Figure 8). The
resulting steganographic bandwidth is ∼0.22 bps.
For what concerns other hardware components of devices,
Cheong et al. [84] exploit both NFC and steganography to
use a smartphone as an access control system, also with the
scope of increasing the security of de-facto standard contact-
less protocols. In details, the NFC is used to interact with
elements of a building, while the access keys needed to actuate
commands (e.g., unlocking doors) are exchanged via hidden
data embedded within the user profile picture.
Another example of internal hardware used for steganogra-
phy is given by [85], where a method using accelerometers
to measure self-induced or external vibrations to establish a
covert channel is explained.
Lastly, the work of Wang et al. [86] deals with a technique
exploiting removable flash memory cards, which are ubiqui-
tously available in many devices. In details, authors propose
to use the RC4 algorithm to choose the locations of the flash
where to hide secret bits. Then, each one is encoded by altering
the electrical characteristics of the card, by means of a pattern
of “stress cycles", which are the number of times a single bit
is written (i.e., set from 0 to 1), or erased (i.e., set from 1 to
0). The hidden data can be shared among two local processes
to exploit a local covert channel, or upon removing the flash
memory, physically moved towards the interested target (as an
“object").
C. Methods Potentially Targeting Smartphones
A very active field of research in steganography applied
to hardware is related to the exploitation of internals of the
IEEE 802.11, which is an ubiquitous standard for wireless
connectivity for smartphones and mobile appliances. Even if
such techniques aim at sending data outside the device (ac-
cording to the taxonomy presented in Section III), we review
them here, since they heavily rely on the interaction with
low-level components of air interfaces, such as the hardware
responsible of performing framing or modulation. Besides,
such techniques particularly require modifications within the
device driver, thus completing the review of steganographic
channels exploitable through the core elements implementing
a smartphone.
In more details, the components of the IEEE 802.11 archi-
tecture that can be used are:
• Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
within the IEEE 802.11n: to strengthen the signal against
obstacles and reflections, the IEEE 802.11n imposes the
usage of a guard interval among two transmissions, which
is filled with a cyclic prefix. The latter improves the
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quality of the transmission since it affects the radio prop-
agation, but its content is discarded by the receiver. The
method proposed in [87] embeds data within the cyclic
prefix, and its performance in terms of steganographic
bandwidth varies according to the used modulation: 3.25
Mbps in Binary Phase Shifting Keying (BPSK), 6.5 Mbps
in Quadrature Phase Shifting Keying (QPSK), 13.0 Mbps
in 16-Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM), and
19.5 Mbps in 64-QAM;
• Frame Control Field (FCF) within the IEEE 802.11a:
the work proposed in [88] analyzes different fields of
the FCF used in the Medium Access Control (MAC)
header of IEEE 802.11 Protocol Data Units (PDUs).
Authors conclude that the most transparent fields are
the Retry, PwrMgt and More Data, enabling the
transmission of hidden messages with a rate of 16.8 bps.
Even if the method is simply detectable, it can be easily
implemented within the device driver of many Linux-
based smartphones (i.e., Android);
• bits used for padding frames in the IEEE 802.11g: the
method discussed by Szczypiorski and Mazurczyk [89]
inserts secret bits into the padding of transmission sym-
bols. Authors also propose how to enhance its stegano-
graphic capacity by using two separate covert channels,
i.e., one living within the padding of data frames having
a capacity of 1.1 Mbps, and another one within ACK
enabling to convey secrets at 0.44 Mbps (therefore, ∼1.65
Mbps when combined);
• hiding data in frames forged to be corrupted: the method
presented by Szczypiorski [90] proposes to waste a
percentage of the overall transmission bandwidth by pro-
ducing corrupt frames containing hidden data. However,
an anomalous Frame Error Rate (FER) could reveal the
steganographic communications. Thus, author proposes
to use a FER of 2.5%, which is normal considering
average environments and mobility, and evaluate that in
an IEEE 802.11g WLAN this method can achieve a
channel capacity of 216 kbps.
Unfortunately, such techniques need a relevant amount of
tests and of engineering to be successfully ported on smart-
phones. In this vein, the major research items needed to bring
them “on the road" are:
• they require the access to device drivers: while this could
be trivial for Android, it is very strict precondition for
other platforms. In addition, device/kernel-level manipu-
lations may lead to system instability, then such methods
must be carefully architected;
• they manipulate the physical/data link layers of the
ISO/OSI stack: despite the availability of drivers, some
low-level features could be non accessible by the soft-
ware. Therefore, proper workaround must be made. Nev-
ertheless, the heterogeneity of features offered by the
implementations “on the wild" (e.g., stacks/interfaces
having reduced capabilities) should be properly evaluated
with a per-device granularity, hence resulting into a very
complex problem space;
• they use a relevant amount of power: wireless transmis-
sion, as well as spinlock-like code needed to intercept
data within the stack, are both energy and CPU consum-
ing tasks. Therefore, this kind of covert channels could
impair the smartphone, or cause unacceptable battery
drains.
VII. SMARTPHONE COMMUNICATION METHODS
Since smartphones have a full-featured TCP/IP protocol
stack, it is possible to theoretically exploit the majority of
the network steganography methods already proposed for
desktops (see, [9], [15] and [16] for surveys on the topic),
for instance, those that are based on packet timing or header
manipulation. Our review reveals that novel network covert
channels specifically crafted for smartphones are still a small
niche. Notwithstanding, they are seldom used as standalone
tools, since they make useful local covert channels discussed in
Section VI. In fact, many of the works dealing with colluding
applications (e.g., [80], [81] and [83]) have the preliminary
goal of exfiltrate data to a process having proper network
privileges (for instance, the Process B depicted in Figure
7).
Then, we firstly survey channels dealing with legacy ser-
vices, and then those using smart communication capabilities.
A. Legacy Services
With the acceptation of “legacy services" we define func-
tionalities related to the telephonic portion of the smartphone,
such as SMS and MMS, which are still very relevant carriers
for steganography. In fact, according to [91], in the second
quarter of 2007, Verizon Wireless alone delivered 28.4 billion
of text messages.
Before introducing techniques, we quickly review SMS and
MMS to give the proper foundation. Put briefly, SMS enables
to send up-to 160 characters encoded into a 140 byte-long
payload. The number of characters varies according to the
alphabet used by the subscriber, e.g., 160 characters when 7 bit
encoding is used, 140 or 70, when using 8 or 16 bit encoding,
respectively. We point out that the SMS service can be also
used to transmit very basic 72×28 pixels B/W pictures. Many
SMS can be concatenated to bypass such limit, thus allowing
a maximum of 255 chained messages. However, many carriers
limit the number of subsequent segments to 8.
Concerning the MMS services, it is more complex, since it
supports different data, ranging from voice to audio, hence re-
quiring proper adaptation layers and interfaces [92]. Similarly
to SMS, also MMS has a narrow capacity: text is limited to
30 kbyte, images to 100 kbyte, and multimedia contents must
be smaller than 300 kbyte.
References [93] and [94] exploit SMS to hide data within
a low resolution picture. The latter is subdivided in blocks of
3×3 pixels, and each one can be set to 1 (black) or 0 (white).
Therefore, each block leads to 29 = 512 possible “shapes".
Within a block, some pixels can be flipped to embed secrets:
even if this introduces noise, a limited amount of changes
could not be noticed (i.e., authors evaluate a maximum of 27
bytes per image before the method becomes useless). At the
same time, the basic nature of two-color ultra-low resolution
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pictures has the following additional drawbacks: the lack of
a richer grayscale makes more difficult to hide data, and this
carrier has a very low degree of resistance against noise.
The works available in references [95] and [96] are more
focused in the textual properties of the SMS. Specifically, three
base methods, which can be mixed to enhance the throughput
of secret data, are proposed:
• acronym patterns: words are substituted by means of
acronyms (e.g., “CM" stands for “call me", or “C" stands
for “see") to build a binary pattern of 1 if the acronym
is used, and 0 otherwise, as to embed secret data;
• alternate spelling: similar to the previous one, but uses
known alternate spellings of a words (e.g., “center"
instead of “centre"). A similar technique is based on using
synonyms;
• white spaces: the secret data is represented via well-
known patterns of spaces among the words, (e.g.,
Hi how are you?). An equivalent method uses
line skipping.
Shirali-Shahreza et al. [97] developed a method based on
Sudoku puzzles embedded within the SMS is presented. In
details, information is hidden within the permutations of a
9× 9 Sudoku scheme.
Rafat [98] exploits the availability of two standard font
classes, namely proportional and system, as a way to produce
secret patterns within the SMS via ad-hoc font changes.
For what concerns the steganographic capacity, all of the
surveyed works do not report a detailed analysis of the achiev-
able throughput. But, the extremely simple nature of SMS
communication always reflect in a very limited bandwidth,
which could be slightly increased by sending concatenated
messages. Besides, when in presence of embedded images,
their B/W nature, jointly with the very limited number of
pixels available rise the same bandwidth problems, and also
make the steganogram easily detectable, and prone to noise,
thus making such methods very fragile.
As regards MMS, references [99] and [100] compare differ-
ent steganographic methods, especially crafted for this carrier.
Summarizing:
• LSB encoding: the message is stored within the LSB of
each pixel composing the image sent via MMS. On the
average, the LSB could be assumed as random noise,
thus its alteration would not have visible effect on the
image. Possible variations include multiple bits changing,
or adding pseudo noise to make the detection harder;
• echo hiding: the information is injected within the audio
of the MMS, by adding an echo generated via a proper
kernel and modulated according to the data to be hidden,
also considering the limited nature of this carrier;
• markup embedding: an MMS can embed also portion of
data described through mark-up languages, such as the
eXtensible Markup Language (XML), HyperText Markup
Language (HTML) or Synchronized Multimedia Inte-
gration Language (SMIL). Then, tags can be reordered
to hide data, since they do not cause any changes to
the rendered text. Unneeded tag, which are usually ig-
nored by the parser, can be exploited for information
hiding purposes. Besides, since spaces and white lines
are ignored as well, the source code of the markup can
be manipulated via the aforementioned white spaces/line
skipping methods.
Mohanapriya [101] introduces a technique using the manip-
ulation of the array of coefficients of the DCT used in the Joint
Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) format. Similarly, Singh
et al. [102] use a low-power signal generated via a spread
spectrum modulation within an image. In details, a Pseudo
Random Noise (PRN) pattern is added to the carrier image
and the seed used for its generation encapsulates the hidden
data. Owing to its reduced power, the hidden message cannot
be detected both by humans or automated tools not having
access to the original/unmodified data. This method is also
more robust to the previous ones using the alteration of the
LSB and DCT.
Jagdale et al. [103] discuss a solution to embed secret
messages within a generic carrier (including MMS), by means
of the aforementioned techniques. The main differences from
the other methods is the prior encryption of the steganographic
message by means of elliptic curve cryptography.
Similarly to SMS, also papers dealing with MMS do
not contain an accurate estimation of the steganographic
bandwidth. However, since they mainly rely upon the same
techniques used for multimedia objects, but with reduced sizes,
their resulting capacity is usually very limited. Therefore, both
SMS and MMS appear as suitable only for very short covert
conversation, or as a method to send a very minimal set of
information (e.g. a secret key) to unlock/decode data delivered
through a more efficient covert channel.
For what concerns voice, Miao et al. [104] exploit features
of the Adaptive Multi-Rate Wideband (AMR-WB) encoder
adopted in 3G communications. The approach highjacks the
search phase of words belonging to the algebraic codebook
used during the encoding process, i.e., some bits of the result-
ing codebook contains the hidden data. Yet, a too aggressive
alteration of codewords worsen the Signal to Noise Ratio
(SNR), eventually resulting into detectable artifacts. Besides,
the steganographic method must also take into account channel
conditions, since the codec alters the features of its stream
according to the measured SNR. For such reasons, authors
proposed a time-varying embedding factor η used to control
the trade-off among the SNR and steganographic bandwidth.
The best tradeoff is achieved when η = 4 leading to a
steganographic bandwidth of 1, 400 bps, which can be used
only for short periods and under error-free channels to avoid
a quick degradation of the voice quality.
A similar approach is presented in the the work pre-
sented in [105], where the the 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP) single-channel narrowband Adaptive Multi-
Rate (AMR) codec is used. Also in this case, some bits of
the codebook are altered resulting into a manipulation of both
the frequency and time envelopes of the voice signals. The
resulting steganographic bandwidth is of 2 kbps.
As regards low-rate standards, Tingting and Zhen [106] deal
with the G.723.1 low-rate codec, offering a steganographic
capacity of 133.3 bps (i.e., altering the 5 least significant bits
of an encoded frame).
17
Lastly, there are also many techniques using the charac-
teristic of the codec used by legacy GSM services, which are
outside the scope of this survey. For the sake of completeness,
we mention, among the others, the work available in [107]
that uses low power tones artificially added within the GSM-
encoded voice.
B. Smart Services
As presented, with the acceptation of smart services we
defined all the functionalities expanding the classical con-
nectivity of the so-called feature phones. As an example of
smart services, we mention Internet connectivity, and all the
applications that can be used on top of the TCP/IP protocol
stack, such as Web browsers or multimedia streaming.
One of the first network covert channel for smartphones
was proposed by Schlegel et al. [80], and it is based on the
utilization of a Web browser, where the request to open URL
was intentionally formed as http://target?number=N,
where N is substituted with the secret data string to be
exfiltrated to the target website.
Gasior and Yang [108] proposed two ideas to implement
a network covert channel. In the first one, authors developed
an application transmitting live video from the camera of an
Android device to a remote server. Then, the steganographic
method creates a covert channel by altering the delays between
the video frames sent to the server. The experimental evalua-
tion was performed in [109] and the resulting steganographic
bandwidth is ∼8 bps. The second covert channel used a tool
that displays an advertisement banner at the bottom of a
running application. The content of the banner was selected
from N different advertisements available, and then requested
to the remote server. The application leaks information by
requesting a specific advertisement to represent a binary values
of the sensitive user data, e.g. the contact list.
Nowadays, it is surely true that OSNs are largely accessed
from smartphones and mobile devices, then we address in
more details steganographic methods that conjugate social
platforms and mobile devices. Castiglione et al. [110] propose
different techniques exploiting photos and websites typically
used by smartphone users for sharing, such as OSNs and
Flickr-like destinations. In more details, authors propose to
exploit features easily manipulable from devices, namely: i)
altering the built-in naming convention often used by devices
(e.g., IMG_xxxx.jpg) to upload files having data embed
in filenames, and ii) exploit the feature named as “tagging"
(i.e., the possibility of annotating digital images by pinpointing
names, locations or GPS positions) to produce sequence of
tags containing secret data. Tagging is also widely supported
by many ad-hoc client interfaces offering an access to OSN
without needing the Web browser. Even if such methods are
quite simple, they have the major benefit of not embedding
information within pictures, thus not requiring specific soft-
ware running on the phone. Moreover, the procedure resists
against possible manipulation implemented by the remote site
(e.g., resizing or recompression).
In [111] the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP), which is at the basis of many OSNs like Facebook or
Google+, as well as many Instant Messaging (IM) services also
available for smartphones, like Google Talk and LiveJournal
Talk is discussed. In this case, the steganographic channel
is created by encoding data within attributes exchanged by
the protocol. For instance, the type attribute, which is case-
insensitive, can embed secret data as follows:
type=‘CHAT’, type=‘chat’ or type=‘cHaT’.
From another perspective, also the work by Kartaltepe et
al. [112] portraits how the Twitter OSN could be used for
steganography, even to coordinate a botnet, or to implement
C&C functionalities. Specifically, a Twitter feeds can be
populated with innocent looking messages (i.e., the tweets)
embedding secret command (for instance by using text-based
steganography as discussed in Section IV-D). Thus bots can
simply retrieve data by issuing an HTTP GET to a public
Twitter account. Commands can be posted from a smartphone,
e.g., via the Twitter client-interface, or the mobile version of
the site.
C. Methods Potentially Targeting Smartphones
As discussed, the availability of many desktop-grade appli-
cations multiply, at least theoretically, the number of network
covert channels to be used on smartphones. To mention the
most popular applications used on mobile devices, we cite
Skype, generic VoIP client interfaces, Facebook (see, e.g., the
popular tool discussed in reference [52]) or the BitTorrent
file-sharing service. Therefore, as desktops and smartphones
progressively converge into a unique platform, we review here
those applications that, at the time of writing, or in near
future, could be used on portable appliances for steganographic
communications.
For the case of Skype, in 2013 a method named Skype
Hide (SkyDe) has been proposed by Mazurczyk et al. [50].
It relies on a feature characterizing the traffic of Skype,
since the actual implementation does not utilize any silence
suppression mechanism. Consequently, PDUs carrying silence
can be easily recognized despite encryption, as they are about
half of the size of PDUs containing voice. Thus, talk/silence
patterns embed the secret communication. The method tested
in a real environment is able to provide a steganographic
bandwidth of ∼2 kbps.
For generic VoIP services, many different methods have
been also proposed (refer to reference [11] for a very recent
survey on this topic). For instance, we mention Transcoding
Steganography (TranSteg) [49] in which the overt data is
compressed to free space exploitable for secrets. Put briefly,
for a voice stream, TranSteg finds a codec that will result
in a similar voice quality but with a smaller payload for
each PDUs. By transcoding the data flow without raising the
suspicions of end users, the obtained additional free space
can be used as a network covert channel. Experimental results
show that TranSteg can achieve 32 kbps when the G.711 codec
is used.
Another possible mechanism is implemented by the Lost
Audio Packets Steganography (LACK) method [113], [114].
LACK takes advantage of excessively delayed voice packets,
which are usually discarded by many multimedia communi-
cation protocols. In this vein, such PDUs are highjacked, and
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a receiver aware of the steganographic exchange can extract
the secret data. As pointed out, the performances in terms of
capacity are tightly ruled by the codec. For instance, when
using the G.711 codec the steganographic bandwidth is ∼600
bps.
As regards popular p2p file-sharing platforms, we mention
the work by Kopiczko et al. [51], where authors propose a
steganographic method for BitTorrent, named StegTorrent. The
basic idea is to modify the order of the PDUs exchanged via
the peer data exchange protocol (i.e., the one used for transfer
data within a swarm). The resulting steganographic bandwidth
for this method is ∼270 bps.
Even if the aforementioned applications are already avail-
able on smartphones, their correct exploitation for the creation
of a network covert channel still needs to be proven. Reasons
are similar to those discussed in Section VI-C, and they are
omitted here for the sake of brevity.
Lastly, we showcase another important class of applications
that are already successfully utilized on desktops for steganog-
raphy: network games. In fact, modern devices have enough
power to run full-featured/desktop-class games, and their en-
hanced connectivity makes them a very powerful platform for
online gaming. An effective approach, which could be easily
borrowed from desktops, is based on embedding secret data
in the traffic used by First Person Shooters (FPSs) to sync the
client(s) and the server.
In details, Zander et al. [115] create a covert channel by
using the popular Quake III Arena FPS. To this aim, an
instrumented client manipulates some bits of the angles used
to locate the orientation of a player within the game world
(also called the map). Yet, the number of alterations should
be minimal, since they add noises, lags or prevent players
to correctly move around the map. Authors report that such
technique offers performances in the range of 8− 18 bps.
Similar ideas have been also used for board games, as
reported in [116] and [117].
VIII. MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
As said, steganography leads to multifaceted privacy and
security implications, thus a part of the research is de-
voted to reveal or prevent covert communications. Generally,
steganography mitigation techniques aim at: i) detecting, ii)
eliminating, and iii) limiting the steganographic bandwidth (or
capacity) [15] of a covert channel. Especially, for i) there is
a well-defined research area called steganalysis, while for ii)
and iii) the lack of universal solutions stems countermeasures
tightly coupled with the specific information hiding technique.
Therefore, in the following, the proper countermeasures for
each type of covert channel are addressed separately.
A. Countermeasures Against Object Covert Channels
Mitigation of object covert channels is the most mature
field among all the possible countermeasures methods. Be-
sides, since modern smartphones can handle contents without
limitations, the reference literature is almost the same for
other computing devices. For such reasons, we adhere on the
classifications for detecting techniques developed in this field
during the years. Even if they differ in some details, all of
them partition steganalysis methods into two main branches
[118]:
• signature: the alterations of the media storing the se-
cret information are detected via searching for known
and well-defined patterns or features. For instance, for
the case of .gif images, their related color palette is
checked against a database of well-known alterations
[119];
• statistical: the hidden data is detected by inspecting how
the manipulated media deviates from an average-known
behavior. As a paradigmatic case, the alteration of the
LSB within an image leads to a noise greater than
the average for a reference class [120] (i.e., threshold
detection).
We underline that both mechanisms depend on the type of
digital objects under investigation, even if the development of
an “universal" technique is still an open research topic [118].
Once the covert communication is detected (i.e., the media
embedding data is recognized) the steganographic channel
is eliminated by removing the hidden information from the
digital object possibly without disrupting the legitimate com-
munication. Such a process is also defined as sanitization
[121].
In the following, we review the main methods used for each
type of object, as presented in Section V.
1) Images: Ker [122] deals with the detection of LSB
manipulation in digital pictures by evaluating the Histogram
Characteristic Function (HFC) of the image (i.e., the energy
distribution of the image histogram in the frequency domain).
HFC methods have been also successfully used to detect data
embedded in images when in presence of more sophisticated
procedures, like the spread spectrum, and the DCT [123].
Moreover, Fridrich et al. [124] introduce another method
for detecting LSB steganography by exploiting a proper mask
inspecting blocks of neighboring bits to detect possible flip-
pings.
Besides, the work presented by Blasco et al. [121] deals
with a proxy for removing hidden data within HTTP headers,
but it also contains review of techniques for sanitizing pictures,
which are typical in-line objects nested within the hypertext
(i.e., the main object).
Another relevant method is based upon image decomposi-
tions algorithms such as wavelets, and then the evaluation of
first/higher-order magnitude and phase statistics [125].
Lastly, we cite the work proposed by Fridrich et al. [126],
which deals with compressed images (e.g., .jpg) and the
F5 algorithm introduced in Section V. Specifically, authors
propose to detect the hidden information by estimating the
histogram via 4x4 pixels blocks to compute the number of
changes introduced by the F5 algorithm.
2) Audio: the detection of LSB-based steganography for
audio files is done in a way similar to images (see, e.g.,
the method proposed in [120]). Yet, a more sophisticated
approach by Geetha et al. is available in [127], which presents
a Genetic Algorithm (GA) classifier to evaluate quality metrics
of audio in order to reveal hidden messages embedded via
LSB, frequency-masking and echo hiding. For all cases, the
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proposed framework proved to be effective, even if hard to
implement due to the need of training the classifier with proper
datasets.
Liu et al. [128] present a more sophisticated approach. Es-
pecially, authors exploit the Mel-Frequency Cepstrum (MFC),
i.e., a representation of the short-term power spectrum of
a sound able to reveal artifacts. The MFC is then jointly
used with the Markov transition features of the second-
order derivative to feed a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to
recognize the steganographic information. We point out that
similar mechanisms are also used for compressed-image, for
instance to evaluate secret data injected among the interbands
of the DCT domains of .jpg carriers, or .mp3s. Since the
latter are very popular, we mention the work available in [129],
where the computation of Markov transition features of each
frequency band of an .mp3 audio is used to recognize hidden
data.
3) Video: techniques used for video analysis are similar
to those already discussed for images and audio, but also
exploiting temporal correlation of the information (i.e., among
frames). For the sake of brevity, a more detailed discussion can
be found in references [130] and [131], as well as references
therein.
However, an interesting emerging format is the one em-
ployed by Youtube, which is one of the most used application
from smartphones and appliances like smart TV or gaming
consoles. Thus, in the perspective of performing steganalysis
of this format, Zhao et al. [132] use the 3D-DCT to capture the
correlation among adjacent frames. Then, statistical features
such as absolute central moments, skewness, and kurtosis are
used to feed an unsupervised k-means clustering classifier.
4) Text: as discussed, modern smartphones can produce and
manipulate large texts, thus being able to exploit about the
totality of linguistic steganography mechanisms available in
literature. Similarly, analysis of related steganograms would
require a complete survey, and it is outside the scope of
this work (see, reference [44] for a thorough discussion on
linguistic steganalysis). Recalling that smartphones are daily
used for editing short text entries (e.g., SMS or emails), or to
adjust/view on the fly popular formats like .pdf documents,
we will review the main steganalysis techniques in such fields.
Specifically:
• word spacing: its detection is done by evaluating the sta-
tistical features of spaces in a document. As an example,
Li et al. [133] propose a mechanisms to detect covert data
within PDF files;
• font formatting: also in this case, some kind of statistical
classifier is trained to detect anomalous font changes or
text formatting. For instance [134] uses SVM to detect
covert channels based on font manipulation, which can
be further transmitted via emails or simple .rtf files;
• synonyms - translations: the availability of built-in dic-
tionaries or on-line translators dramatically increases the
usage of such techniques. In this perspective, tools to
perform steganography-steganalysis of texts have been in-
vestigated. This is the case of reference [135] dealing with
techniques to automatically produce/detect steganograms
by means of large databases of synonyms.
B. Countermeasures Against Local Covert Channels
The most popular mitigation system engineered for local
covert channel was proposed by Enck et al. [136]. Authors in-
troduced TaintDroid, i.e., a monitoring system for information
flows that operates in real-time in order to detect and prevent
leakage of sensitive user data by a misbehaving application. If
a flow of information is noticed between a private and public
resources, then TaintDroid stops this stream. A key technique
utilized is taint tracking, which relies on data labeling to
enable its tracing and propagation through files, variables and
interprocess messages.
An evolution is QuantDroid [137], which is built upon
TaintDroid. Besides monitoring contextual information about
what data leaves an application, it also quantity the captured
“volume", as a possible metric to reduce the risk of false
positives.
Later, an approach called XManDroid (eXtended Monitor-
ing on Android) [138] has been proposed. It monitors and
analyzes communication links across applications by inspect-
ing the inter-component communication calls or the runtime
use of the system Application Programming Interface (API).
In details, if information flows based on the defined security
policy are considered malicious, then they are forbidden. A
typical example of a policy is “an application that has read
access to user SMS database must not communicate to an
application that has network access" [138]. Therefore, the key
design issue of XManDroid (and similar tools) is to define
correct security policies, since too tight enforcements may
cause disruptions for non-malicious applications.
Another similar solution is CHEX [139], which instead
utilizes static analysis (with the acceptation of off-line). CHEX
enables the automatic monitoring of component with vulner-
abilities that could be hijacked by a malicious application
resulting into sensitive data leakages. To this aim, the tool
performs a set of reachability tests on dependence graphs
of the smartphone, built by considering the correct/dangerous
access control policies among different applications and func-
tionalities. By using this model, the tool is able to evaluate if
there is an improperly implemented access granted leading to
accidentally leaks of private data, or to execute unauthorized
read/write operations on sensitive resources.
A simple solution for mitigating local covert channels for
Android smartphones based on modifying volume and vibra-
tion settings (e.g., like methods proposed by Schlegel et al.
[80]) has been introduced and evaluated by Hansen et al. [140],
and it is advised to be used in conjunction with a system-wide
tool like TaintDroid. Authors propose an application layer
exploiting a threshold-based algorithm, considering the past
history of events in a time window. In this way, they can
detect burst/anomalous changes in the settings revealing the
hidden communication. By knowing the threshold, malicious
applications can beat the countermeasure, but at least they
must reduce the transmission rate.
However it must be noted that some of the local covert
channels introduced in [81], [83] and [80] are not detected by
TaintDroid (solutions [137] and [139] were not tested since
still not publicly available at the time of such studies). As a
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more general consideration, we point out that the channels that
avoid detection are those reading the “state" of the OS. Hence,
part of the ongoing research is focused on their successful
detection.
Lastly, the work of [85] portraits a countermeasure to
defend against covert channels using the accelerometer sensors
available within modern smartphones. In fact, their increasing
resolutions (i.e., ∼100 MHz) enables the creation of stealth
channels both for transmission and for detecting surrounding
events (e.g., the keys entered on a desktop computer if the
device is located near - or - on the very same desk). In
this perspective, authors propose to implement a defendant
applications randomly producing vibrations to interfere with
potential sensing malware.
C. Countermeasures Against Network Covert Channels
Before reviewing countermeasures for network covert chan-
nels, we point out that, as today, there are not any solutions
solely developed for smartphones. Yet, they were proposed
for generic TCP/IP architectures, hence they can be also
applicable to mitigate network steganography in smartphones
(even if with some minor tweaks).
Generally, potential mitigation techniques against network
covert channels can be broadly classified into one of three
groups:
• network traffic normalizers: normalization aims at re-
moving ambiguities in network traffic that is exploited
for steganographic schemes (e.g., the alteration of inter
packet times to encode secret data). Typically, normal-
izers are divided according to whether they capture a
context of the transmission, thus [141]:
– stateless: they analyze only one packet at time;
– statefull: they consider a packet in a wider context,
e.g., an end-to-end conversation.
Existing normalizers can be a part of the intrusion detec-
tion/prevention systems like Snort [142] or a dedicated
solution like the network-aware active warden proposed
in [143] or the network pump [144]. In a similar extent,
Lewandowski et al. [145] deal with general techniques
applied to IPv6, which will be increasingly adopted in
future 5G and beyond mobile devices.
The biggest drawbacks of network normalizers include
[146]: i) side-effects as due to normalization process, e.g.,
part of the protocols headers cannot be further utilized,
thus causing a loss of functionality; ii) the limited buffer
size used to perform analysis could be exhausted when
in presence of large traffic volumes, hence they lack of
scalability; iii) packets can be sent using different routes
resulting in incomplete normalizations. As a workaround,
traffic should be monitored in different portion of the
network, eventually resulting in a framework difficult to
configure and maintain; iv) traffic normalization cannot
be too aggressive as to avoid degradation to Quality of
Service (QoS) or Quality of Experience (QoE), hence it
is not a definitive solution against covert channels;
• statistical methods include approaches to reveal/prevent
encoding secret data bits into features characterizing the
network traffic (e.g., the inter-arrival time of PDUs).
As paradigmatic cases, Berk et al. [147] focus on tech-
niques comparing the inter-arrival times distributions of
“clean" network traffic and steganographically modified
one, while in [148] the entropies of packets’ inter-arrival
times are inspected and then matched.
Three another approaches were proposed by Cabuk et al.
[149]. The main one exploits data compression applied to
inter-arrival time values as the indicator of the presence
of a covert channel. Hence: i) inter-arrivals are computed
for each packet; ii) values are converted as strings; iii) the
resulting “text" is compressed. The more the compression
is efficient, the greater is the risk that the flow of packets
contains a covert channel. In fact, the alteration of inter-
arrival times to hide data would produce more regular
timing statistics, thus making the compression algorithm
to perform better (i.e., equal times will lead to equal
strings). The remaining two statistical methods are based
on: comparing standard deviation of recorded inter-arrival
times, and evaluation of -similarity;
• machine learning approaches rely mainly on trained
classifiers capable of distinguishing between traffic with a
covert channel and normal network flows. Such solutions
include utilization of SVMs [150], neural networks [151]
or C4.5 decision trees [152] and [153]. Similarly for
the case of object covert channels, also such methods
have the main drawback of needing a proper dataset for
training the classifiers.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Modern smartphones are an excellent playground for the
development of new steganographic methods, and also, as a
consequence of their importance, they will be likely to become
one of the most targeted platforms for data exfiltration. To
classify the work done, we developed a taxonomy to partition
methods in three covert channels, and we also evaluated pos-
sible countermeasures. We can summarize the lessons learned
and the major findings of this survey as follows:
• currently the most active trend is the one aiming at
the creation of local covert channels for Android-based
devices. By considering the future developments of many
works, it appears that in the near future new low-
bandwidth methods will be introduced, as well as the
willingness of the research community of starting some
active development over iOS or WindowsPhone;
• currently little attention is devoted to network covert
channels exploiting specificities of smartphones. Yet, this
field is the most promising research one for smartphone
steganography, especially because routing data outside
the device secretly is a core requirement to make the
colluding applications scenario a real threat;
• digital media steganography for smartphones does not
add any novelty compared to desktops, apart some works
on QR codes. Nevertheless, video steganography applied
to mobile devices is still a largely underestimated research
area;
• the tools “for the masses" available in application markets
do not appear as enablers for serious, hardly discoverable
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secret communications. Yet, they allow to present the
concept of information hiding to the laymen;
• a portion of the mitigation techniques addresses some of
the smartphone steganography methods (mostly those that
result in local covert channel), but they are not universal
enough nor efficient to be practically deployed for real-
time detection;
• as it can be noticed by the differences in the amount of pa-
pers surveyed, the research community is more active in
developing covert channels, rather than countermeasures.
In addition, the latter are method-specific and there is
not any general solution especially for multidimensional
carriers as smartphones.
We hope that this survey motivates to increase the efforts on
researching both steganography and steganalysis over smart-
phones. By evaluating the pros and cons of each paper, our
investigation revealed some uncovered areas. Therefore, in our
perspective, some potential research directions are:
• energy consumption: investigating the energy consump-
tions of networking and security mechanisms is a hot re-
search topic, especially on handheld devices [154]. Alas,
about the totality of surveyed works neglect this particu-
lar. Moreover, understanding the impact of steganography
in terms of power depletion can be used as an effective
detection method. Part of the future research should be
aimed at filling this gap;
• learn from the past: even if they could appear anachronis-
tic, SMS-like steganography could be a relevant source of
data and hazards in the near future. In fact, the availability
of flat-rate 3G data plans, jointly with applications for
sending messages through the Internet (e.g., Apple iMes-
sage, Viber or Whatsapp) will likely to be affected by the
same mechanisms, but on a magnified scale factor. This
could be a challenging scenario especially for detection,
which should be done in real-time and scalable manner,
also by preserving privacy;
• devices and clouds: the diffusion of the cloud-based
paradigm enables a variety of services moving data from
the device to the Internet (and vice versa). In this vein,
a plethora of new patterns should be investigated as
possible steganography carriers, e.g., crafted subsequent
syncing of documents (for instance when collaborating
through shared storage like Google Drive), data embed-
ment within voice-based services (for instance, Google
Voice) and protocol hijacking of Web-based GUIs. At
the same time, this field of research also needs the
development of proper countermeasures;
• develop mitigation techniques: as shown, local covert
channels (Section VI) are still poorly detected, especially
those using the “state" of the OS. Thus, this field of
research would be a very challenging playground in the
near future.
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